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Abstract
A considerable literature examines the effect of voter information on candi-
date strategies and voter-politician interactions in the developing world. The
voter information literature argues that information can improve accountability
because more informed voters are harder to woo with traditional campaign tools,
such as ethnic appeals and vote-buying. However, this literature has largely ig-
nored the reaction of political candidates and thus may reach conclusions that are
overly optimistic regarding the impact of information on electoral accountability.
We argue that voter information can increase electoral violence in developing
countries where politicians face fewer institutional constraints on their campaign
tactics. When violence is used as a campaign strategy, more informed electorates
are more at risk because they are harder to sway through alternative campaign
techniques. Using data from 35 African countries, we show that respondents re-
ceiving their news predominantly from newspapers are a good proxy for informed
voters because they differ in terms of their political attitudes from respondents
consuming no news or receiving it via other channels. Combining the geocoded
survey data with pre-electoral violence event data, we find a robust positive as-
sociation between newspaper readership and fear of and exposure to campaign
violence. This finding contributes to the micro-foundations of election violence
and adds a cautionary note for voter information programs.
A considerable literature examines the effect of voter information on candidate strategies
and voter-politician interactions in the developing world. Research shows that uninformed
voters are more prone to ethnic voting, clientelistic politics, and vote buying (Chandra,
2004; Posner, 2005; Kitschelt, 2000). In contrast, exposure to information makes citizens
less likely to sell their votes (Banerjee et al., 2011; Vicente, 2014; Bratton, 2008; Erlich,
forthcoming; Nichter, 2008), less likely to vote along ethnic lines (Ichino & Nathan, 2013;
Banerjee et al., 2010), and more critical of politicians’ campaign promises (Ferraz & Finan,
2008) and campaign actions (Gutierrez-Romero & LeBas, 2020). All of this suggests that
exposure to information makes citizens harder to woo by traditional means of campaign-
ing, leading researchers to conclude that voter information improves political accountability
(see Pande, 2011) and consequently results in more responsible and more policy-oriented
politicians (Besley, 2006; Besley & Burgess, 2002). More recent studies cast doubt on the
effectiveness of information interventions but interestingly point out that politicians believe
that voter information interventions are effective, may change voter behavior, and thus need
to be countered, for example by undermining the dissemmination of negative information
(Dunning et al., 2019). However, the literature has largely ignored the responses of politicians
(Pande, 2011: 233; Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita, 2014), especially where politicians are
less constrained in their use of campaign strategies, which may include fraud, vote buying,
and violence (Schedler, 2002; Burchard, 2015; Bekoe, 2012; Norris, Frank & Martinez I Coma,
2015). In these contexts, politicians may react violently towards informed voters, suggesting
that the voter information literature might have reached too optimistic conclusions.
We argue that in less institutionalized contexts, informed electorates are more at risk
of being exposed to election violence. If informed voters are harder to woo through tradi-
tional campaign tools (e.g., policy, ethnic appeals, vote buying), as suggested by the voter
information literature, and incumbents know in which locations these campaign strategies
are failing or have failed during past election campaigns, then these voters might be more
likely to be exposed to violence in order to change their behavior during the election. Hence,
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when violence is used as a campaign strategy, informed voters are more at risk than unin-
formed voters. This sheds light on the information-accountability link (Ashworth & Bueno de
Mesquita, 2014), which examines how voter information affects the interaction between vot-
ers and politicians. We also contribute to the microfoundations of election violence. Much
research points to politicians inciting election violence and specifically incumbents being the
main perpetrator of campaign violence (e.g., Straus & Taylor, 2012). We contribute to this
work by noting that politicians may react negatively towards informed voters when facing
fewer constraints on their behavior, such as in developing democracies.
An illustrative and well-documented example of this dynamic is Zimbabwe. At least since
2000, the ruling party (ZANU-PF) has regularly intimidated informed groups in the run-
up to elections. Informed people at higher risk of violence in communities include teachers,
principals, student leaders, journalists, medical professionals, and business people (UNESCO,
2014: 205-207; Unknown, 2000; Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, 2009: 13-14, 36; Re-
search and Advocacy Unit, 2012: 8-9). Pre-election intimidation of these groups tends to
be widespread, with more than half of the teachers reporting having been intimidated be-
tween 2000 and 2012 (Research and Advocacy Unit, 2012: 16-17; Unknown, 2000). These
intimidation campaigns also aim for a wider audience, as teachers are usually beaten in
full view of students during regular school hours (Research and Advocacy Unit, 2012: 2).
Information seems to be important for victimization, as teachers were targeted when they
tried to distribute information flyers about Zimbabwe’s collapsing education system (Human
Rights Watch, 2008: 2). During the voter registration period, teachers seem to be targets
of campaign violence – especially in ruling party strongholds – because they might encour-
age others to register to vote and because they were perceived ‘as having an influence on
local communities’ (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 3-4). Importantly, both opposition and
government-affiliated teachers were more likely to be targeted than non-partisan teachers;
and among election officials, teachers were still at greater risk (Research and Advocacy Unit,
2012: 18). Politicians willing to use campaign violence seem more likely to direct it at in-
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formed groups in an effort to change their behavior in the run-up to elections and through
them the behavior of others in the community.
To assess our argument systematically, we leverage geo-coded individual-level survey data
from 35 African countries and event-level data of pre-electoral violence. We use newspaper
readership as a proxy for information. In line with our predictions, we find that newspaper
readers are more fearful of campaign violence and are more likely to be exposed to campaign
violence.1 The information effects on violence are substantively important: the difference in
fear between newspaper readers and non-readers is nearly half the difference in fear between
incumbent and opposition partisans. Newspaper readers are on average 3.8 percentage points
more likely to fear and 3.6% more likely to be exposed to an election related violent event near
their location than non-readers. We also investigate the underlying theoretical mechanisms
and find that newspaper readers show similar attitudes and beliefs to informed voters in the
voter information literature.
Our finding has implications for two important literatures: voter information and ac-
countability, and election violence. Experimental studies have shown that voter information
about the political process and politician performance increases participation (Mvukiyehe
& Samii, 2017; Aker, Collier & Vicente, 2017) and induces electorates to punish and re-
ward politicians (Chong et al., 2015; Ferraz & Finan, 2008; Banerjee et al., 2011; Ichino
& Nathan, 2013; Gutierrez-Romero & LeBas, 2020; Pande, 2011). However, for a better
informed electorate to cause better governance, politicians need to change from clientelist to
programmatic and performance-based campaigning. Whether they do so is an open empiri-
cal question. Recent studies suggest that voter information can make politicians change the
timing of malpractices (Bobonis, Fuertes & Schwabe, 2016) and prompt them to use coer-
cion (Fergusson, Vargas & Vela, 2004). We provide evidence that more informed individuals
1Our objective measure of violence exposure is based on geographic proximity and thus does not allow
identifying individual targets, while the fear measure shows who personally felt more affected. The results
for both measures point in the same direction.
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are more fearful of and more exposed to campaign violence. This adds an important cau-
tionary note on the use of information to strengthen electoral accountability in developing
democracies.
Second, our findings contribute to the burgeoning research on election violence by ad-
dressing the puzzle of who is at risk of campaign violence. About a quarter of elections
worldwide are accompanied by electoral violence, mostly – but not exclusively – in develop-
ing countries (Fischer, 2002: 11; Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014: 151; Borzyskowski,
2019: 34). Most of this violence takes place in the run-up to election day, which is also our
focus. Formal models identify partisanship as a key predictor of who gets targeted by cam-
paign violence (Chaturvedi, 2005; Collier & Vicente, 2012; Robinson & Torvik, 2009). While
incumbent partisans are consistently found to be least likely to fear or experience victim-
ization in the run-up to elections, the primary targets of campaign violence vary across
countries (Kuhn, 2013; Bratton, 2008: 624; Wallsworth, 2016: 101): sometimes it is opposi-
tion partisans, at other times it is non-partisans.2 This lack of knowledge about the targets
of election violence is puzzling and highly relevant for research and policy. We contribute to
filling this gap in the microfoundations of electoral violence by presenting empirical evidence
that more informed voters are systematically at higher risk of intimidation, controlling for
partisanship and other individual and location characteristics. We show that even among
incumbent partisans, more informed citizens are more likely to be exposed to violence.
Voter information and campaign violence
In developing democracies, politicians often have a larger menu of available campaign strate-
gies at their disposal because they face fewer institutional constraints than in advanced
democracies. In addition to the usual tools of influencing citizens’ vote choice through posi-
tioning, advertising, and mobilizing, politicians in developing democracies can also resort to
2For post-election violence victimization, see Dercon & Gutierrez-Romero, 2012; Gutierrez-Romero, 2014.
For a study on the 2011 Guatemala election and an argument about targeting poor and rural citizens, see
Gonzales-Ocantos et al., 2020.
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fraud, vote buying, and violence (Schedler, 2002; Southall, 2013). Election-related violence
is political violence to influence the process or outcome of an election. Campaign violence,
i.e. the use of force as a strategic tool prior to election day, is often used to shape turnout
or vote choice (Straus & Taylor, 2012: 20; Wilkinson & Haid, 2009).
Campaign violence is often intended to have effects beyond the immediate targets. Co-
ercive violence can be low level and is meant to instill fear and paralyze the surrounding
community or area and ‘performs a communicative function with a clear deterrent dimension’
(Kalyvas, 2006: 26-28). While some individuals are directly targeted, low-level political vio-
lence is intended to terrorize the surrounding community which is exposed to intimidation,
and to shape the broader community’s actions. Voters who are exposed to violence in their
community but do not experience it personally may still become fearful of being targeted in
the future, leading them to adapt their behavior. The effectiveness of coercive violence is
well documented for election campaigns in sub-Saharan Africa, where a small percentage of
people is directly affected but a much higher percentage of people is fearful of becoming a
victim of campaign violence (Bratton 2008; Gutierrez-Romero 2014).3
While election violence can in principle be (or look) spontaneous, most studies point
to it being orchestrated by politicians, particularly incumbent politicians or their affiliates.
Specifically, about 80 percent of pre-election violence in sub-Saharan Africa is orchestrated
by incumbent politicians (Straus & Taylor, 2012: 29-30; Sachikonye, 2011: 19; International
Crisis Group, 2007b: 4). Politicians often activate local party youth wings or hire thugs for
implementation (Laakso, 2009: 231-232, 243-244; Mehler, 2009: 204-206; Makumbe, 2002:
91; Masunungure, 2011: 55-57).
3For example, Bratton (2008: 624) documents that while only 4% of Nigerians reported being directly
affected by electoral violence and intimidation, 56% of Nigerians were at least a little fearful of becoming a
victim of political violence or intimidation in the forthcoming election. Similarly, Gutierrez-Romero (2014:
1505) documents for Kenya that while only 9% reported being personally threatened negative consequences
for their voting behavior, 32% of respondents heard about violent political groups being active in their
neighborhood.
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Politicians also often hire local agents to help overcome information problems (Stokes,
2011; Stokes et al., 2013). In many developing countries, local party representatives are
present in polling stations during voting and counting, observing who voted. In many African
countries, polling-station-level election results posted outside the polling station or on the
election commission website provide information on the vote choice and turnout of each
neighborhood/village (Koter, 2013: 194). This means politicians and their local intermedi-
aries have detailed spatial information on where their campaigns have succeeded or failed
in past elections. This information is then used to shape their campaigning strategy in the
next election (Koter, 2013: 194).
Politicians and their intermediaries can also use local knowledge to identify more informed
voters. A large body of work has shown how politicians in developing countries use local
agents to target illicit campaign strategies, such as vote and turnout buying and electoral
clientelism (Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2011; Stokes et al., 2013). Because local
party operatives have knowledge about the local communities in which they are embedded,
it is possible for them to identify individuals (Schaffer & Baker, 2015: 1099; Stokes et al.,
2013: 75). Research on African elections has documented how politicians employ local
agents deeply embedded in communities (Kramon 2017; Izama and Wilkinson 2012, 67).
While these studies examine the local targeting of positive incentives (vote buying, turnout
buying), we shift the focus to negative incentives such as violent intimidation (Mares &
Young, 2016; Gottlieb, 2017; Chuang & Schechter, 2015: 16). Studies have shown how
politicians’ local intermediaries direct threats of punishment and coercion at individualss
(Mares & Young, 2018, 2019). Local party operatives have information which can be used
by party youth wings or thugs for intimidation. We build on these previous studies and
argue that local knowledge about the community can also be used to direct intimidation, as
documented for Zimbabwe (Bratton, 2008) and Uganda (Conroy-Kutz & Logan, 2012: 647).
We argue that when politicians resort to violence during election campaigns, more in-
formed voters are more likely to be at risk than uninformed voters because more informed
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voters reduce the effectiveness of other campaign tools (such as ethnic appeals or vote buy-
ing) and threaten a candidate’s chances of winning the election. More informed electorates
are harder to sway by common campaign strategies, such as clientelistic exchanges, bribery,
and ethnic appeals. Research has shown that more informed voters are more critical of
campaign promises, especially if a politician’s performance record is bad (Ferraz & Finan,
2008), less susceptible to ethnic cues (Ichino & Nathan, 2013; Banerjee et al., 2010), and less
likely to sell their votes (Banerjee et al., 2011; Vicente, 2014; Bratton, 2008; Nichter, 2008).
Candidates often make campaign promises that they do not fulfill as incumbent politicians,
generating disappointment among voters. The more informed citizens are about what the
incumbent failed to achieve, the more likely they are to be disappointed and non-supportive.
If incumbents cannot convince those prospective voters to support them through the use
of non-violent campaign techniques and fear losing office, they have incentives to resort to
violence to change the electoral behavior of those non-supportive groups.
An empirical illustration is Uganda’s recent (2016) election. The Ugandan government
and ruling party officials intimidated and threatened journalists to keep them from provid-
ing information to voters. As one journalist noted, ‘I think government intends to keep the
people uninformed [...] You see, uninformed people are easy to manipulate. Cases of intim-
idation are prevalent [...] As journalists, we are forced to cover up. In the reporting you
don’t hit the nail on top. You have to communicate carefully. In election season we see this
very clearly.’ Human Rights Watch (2016b) notes that the ‘government has likewise clamped
down on domestic organizations, particularly those working on human rights, including voter
education.’ Another Human Rights Watch report (2016a: 1-2, 19, 26) notes that the Ugan-
dan police has harassed journalists and ordered them not to write about campaign rallies by
opposition candidates. Civil society organizations, too, ‘face challenges talking about critical
issues, and informing voters about key issues, violating rights to both free expression and
association’ as elections draw near. This has become known as ‘de-campaigning,’ which is
one way of limiting voter information about political alternatives. This is one example of
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politician actions (a) to limit voter information in order to better manipulate voters and (b)
to direct campaign violence at more informed citizens who might pose a threat to politicians’
re-election chances.
Our argument has two main observable implications for the relationship between voter
information and campaign violence. Specifically, it implies that more informed individuals
(1) should fear campaign violence more and (2) should be more exposed to campaign violence
than uninformed voters. In the subsequent sections we provide empirical evidence in support
of these predictions and the underlying theoretical mechanism outlined above.
Research design
This section introduces our data and empirical strategy. We combine two different data
sources to measure our main variables: (1) geocoded survey data for 35 African countries
from 2014/15; and (2) geocoded campaign violence event data. Our unit of analysis is an
individual i.4
Exposure to independent information
Voter information is measured by exposure to independent information, which is captured by
regular newspaper readership. Information comes through the ability to read and consume
newspapers, which on average are less controlled by the state (Djankov et al., 2003: 357-359)5
and provide more local and regional political information than other forms of mass media.
4Summary statistics of and bivariate correlations between all variables are provided in Appendix Table A.I
and Appendix Table A.II, respectively.
5In 16 of the 22 countries in our sample for which Djankov et al. (2003) reports data, the press is more
free, whereas in the remaining six (Burundi, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Niger and Togo) broadcasting and
print media have the same level of media freedom (Djankov et al., 2003: 357-359). For the remaining 13
countries in our sample we lack comparable data but believe the pattern is similar. We have searched
for more recent data, but were unable to find any similarly detailed information on media ownership. In
particular, while there are various annual media freedom indices, they fail to distinguish between the press
and broadcasters.
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Information on newspaper readership comes from the sixth wave of the Afrobarometer Survey
(AFB6), which was administered in 36 African countries in 2014/15.6 Newspaper readership
is measured on a five-point Likert scale (AFB6, q12c) ranging from ‘never’ (0) to ‘daily’
(4). Given the question’s reliance on respondents’ recall and calculation of averages across
an unspecified time period, we follow a conservative approach by dichotomizing the ordinal
measure: a respondent is considered a Newspaper reader if (s)he gets the news from a paper
at least a few times a month (i.e., q12c > 1).7 Across all countries in the sample 32.3%
of all respondents read a newspaper at least a few times a month with significant variation
between countries ranging from 1.6% in Burundi to 87.7% in Mauritius.
Outcomes
Campaign violence is measured in two ways: (1) with an objective measure, the number
of Election-related conflict events near a location; and (2) with a subjective measure, Fear
of campaign violence. For the objective measure we count the number of election-related
conflict events within 25km8 of a location during the six months prior to the last three
6Political parties are forbidden in Swaziland. As partisanship and partisan affiliation are important
control variables in our regressions, we exclude Swaziland. The remaining 35 countries are not a random
sample. They tend to be concentrated in West, East, Northern, and Southern Africa, so the following results
may not apply to the whole continent. To avoid spatial measurement error, we drop all respondents whose
geographic location could only be pinpointed at the district, region or country level, which is 28.75% of
the sample. In Appendix Table A.III we show that, conditional on the full set of controls (see below) and
country fixed effects, there are no systematic statistical differences in our main explanatory and outcomes
variables between geographically precisely and imprecisely coded subsets. Hence, dropping the imprecisely
coded observations does not bias our findings.
7All our findings are robust to using the ordinal scaled index as shown in Appendix Table A.IV.
8The 25km radius was chosen to reflect the average action radius of an individual to proxy for exposure.
Our results, however, do not depend on the particular distance chosen. Appendix Table A.IV, Panel B,
Columns 1 and 2 show that the results are qualitatively similar when using a 10 or 40km radii instead.
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national elections.9 The event data are taken from the Social Conflicts in Africa Database
(SCAD) Version 3 (Salehyan et al., 2012), which contains information on protests, riots,
strikes, inter-communal conflict, government violence against civilians, and other forms of
social conflict. Its primary sources of information are the Associated Press (AP) and the
Agence France Presse (AFP) wires, as compiled by the Lexis-Nexis news service.10 We filter
the data in two ways for each of the last three national elections: by time (from six months
prior to the election through election day) and by type (only election-related events). We
also drop all events that could not be precisely geocoded.11 The median electoral conflict
event in our sample lasts one day and stays short of fatalities, although a third of the events
result in up to twenty deaths. The most common event types in our sample are riots and
pro-government violence, with the latter defined as violence initiated and ‘waged primarily
by government authorities or groups acting in explicit support of government authority’
(Hendrix & Salehyan, 2013: 3). A higher number of events in close proximity to a location
indicates an increased exposure to election-related violence during the most recent election
campaigns. As the event count is positively skewed, we logarithmize the event count to
reduce the impact of outliers.
9If a national election was held within less than six months of a previous national election, then the
previous election was ignored to avoid conflating pre- and post-election violence events, as the two types of
election violence have distinct spatial patterns. Our results are robust to using only the number of events in
the last two national elections, see Appendix Table A.IV, Panel B, Column 3.
10We call this measure ‘objective’ to contrast it with the more subjective measure from individual-level sur-
veys but are aware of the potential for reporting bias in media-based event data such as SCAD (Borzyskowski
& Wahman, forthcoming). We assess reporting bias in the robustness section, and also use the subjective
fear measure as one way to validate the event data in this study.
11Using the geocoding information in SCAD we drop events without location precision, where the exact
event location is unknown, where only province is given, and where events are coded as nationwide with
several but unidentified locations. This ensures a clean link between respondent and event location at the
village level. Our results are robust to restricting our sample to those countries for which we have no
imprecisely geocoded violent events (see Appendix Table A.IV, Panel B, Column 4).
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Our subjective measure of campaign violence is based on self-reported Fear of campaign
violence. The Afrobarometer survey question ‘During election campaigns in this country,
how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?’
(AFB6, q49) has responses ranging from ‘not at all’ (0) to ‘a lot’ (3). We distinguish
between those respondents without and those with at least a little fear of victimization (i.e.,
q49>0). The subjective measure has two advantages: it allows us to assess the impact
of newspaper readership on violent campaign events below the AP’s and AFP’s reporting
thresholds (such as threats and intimidation) and it serves as a validation of the event
data. There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between our objective and
subjective measures of campaign violence (χ2(12) = 483.96), suggesting that exposure and
fear are positively associated.
To assess the extent to which newspaper readers share attributes with informed voters as
described in the voter information literature, we look at four variables from the AFB6: the
extent of a respondent’s Interest in public affairs (AFB6, q14) and the extent to which they
Discuss politics with friends or family (AFB6, q14), which both record answers on Likert
scales starting at zero, with higher values indicating more interest and discussion; the extent
to which a respondent perceives themselves purely or mostly in Ethnic rather than national
terms (AFB6, q88B); the extent to which a respondent agrees that the executive is subject
to the Rule of law (AFB6, q38), and whether a respondent prefers Democracy over all other
forms of government (AFB6, q30=3).
Control variables
In addition to country fixed effects, we include alternative information, geographic, demo-
graphic, socio-economic, and political controls to account for alternative explanations. To
capture the independent informational effect of newspapers on fear of and exposure to elec-
tion violence, all our regressions include indicators for alternative information sources, i.e.,
Radio (AFB6, q12a>1), TV (AFB6, q12b>1), and Internet (AFB6, q12d>1). We use news-
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paper readership as a proxy for the informedness of a respondent rather than radio or TV,
as the proportion of state-controlled outlets across Africa is larger among broadcasters than
the press (Djankov et al., 2003: 357-359) and broadcasters generally put more weight on na-
tional and international relative to local and regional news given their broader audience and
advertising constraints. The internet provides access to the largest variety of independent
political information, but is not a valid alternative to the newspaper proxy in the African
context. While connectivity has increased, it is still low (Silver & Johnson, 2018), especially
with regard to the 3G/4G connectivity necessary to browse websites and access social media
(Global System for Mobile Communications Association, 2018: 43-49). Moreover, in many
African countries the internet’s infrastructure is controlled by the state, allowing govern-
ments to restrict access or shut down the internet all together around elections (Freyburg &
Garbe, 2018).
As education levels, newspaper density, and political competition in many African states
is greater in urban compared to rural areas and political activity is often concentrated in and
around the capital, we include Urban (AFB6, urbrur) and Capital (AFB6, geoname_adm_name)
indicators, as well as the logged shortest Distance to capital in km.
To account for demographic differences in newspaper readership and fear of election
violence we include Age and Age2 (AFB6, q1) and whether the respondent is Male (AFB6,
thisint).
The set of socio-economic controls include Living condition- (AFB6, q4c), Employment-
(AFB6, q95), and Education- (AFB6, q97) fixed effects, as well as an index of Poverty
(AFB6, mean(q8a-e)). Their aim is to account for differences in respondents’ ability to read
newspapers as well as their ability to protect themselves from campaign violence.
Finally, as newspapers are the least state controlled mass media outlets (Djankov et al.,
2003) and partisanship may influence electoral violence targeting (e.g., Kuhn, 2013), we
include partisanship indicators for whether a respondent is a Non-partisan (AFB6, q90a)
or, based on the parties in power before the last national election, whether they were an
12
Incumbent partisan (AFB6, q90b).12 The baseline category in all regressions is identifying
as an opposition partisan.
Empirical strategy
We estimate the effect of information exposure from newspapers on a respondent’s fear of
and exposure to campaign violence using the following main specification:13
Outcome = β1Newspaper readeri + γXi + α + i, (1)
where γXi denotes the set of individual controls, α the country fixed effects, and i
the idiosyncratic error term. The main coefficient of interest is β1. As survey respondents
are clustered by location and our objective measure of campaign violence is measured at
the location rather than individual level, we estimate location clustered standard errors
throughout.
Empirical analysis
Main results
Figure 1 presents the coefficient estimates on fear of campaign violence (left) and exposure
to election-related conflict events (right).14
Figure 1 here
Figure 1 depicts the coefficient estimates and their 95% confidence intervals for models
12Respondents in countries with executives without party affiliations are all coded zero; dropping those
cases does not change our findings substantially.
13Our results are qualitatively similar when using the conditional logit estimator with the dichotomous
outcome variable. As there are few differences between linear and non-linear models with regard to estimating
marginal effects (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Beck, 2015) and the interpretation and comparability of linear
models across outcomes is easier, we rely on OLS fixed effects regressions throughout.
14The full regression results underlying this figure are provided in Appendix Table C.I.
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with different sets of control variables: the baseline model (circles), including country fixed
effects, alternative news sources, geographic, and demographic controls, the baseline model
plus socioeconomic controls (squares), and the baseline model plus socioeconomic and polit-
ical controls (triangles). Across all three specifications newspaper readers are significantly
more likely to fear campaign violence. On average, newspaper readers are 3.8 percentage
points more fearful of becoming a victim of campaign violence than non-readers, indepen-
dent of geographic, demographic, socio-economic, and political factors. The estimate is quite
stable across specifications and substantively meaningful: the difference in fear between read-
ers and non-readers is nearly half the difference in fear between incumbent and opposition
partisans.
Similarly, the results on the objective measure of campaign violence reveals that news-
paper readers are on average 3.6% more likely to be exposed to an election-related violent
event than non-readers, which remains fairly stable across model specifications. Compared
to the baseline risk, regular newspaper readers have a 28% greater risk of being exposed to
an election-related violent event than non-readers.
The findings for the three other news sources are mixed. While radio listeners are more
fearful of campaign violence, there is no statistically significant association between radio
and exposure to election-related violent events. Respondents receiving their news by TV
are more likely to be exposed to violent events, but are not significantly more likely to fear
becoming a victim of campaign violence. Finally, receiving news via the internet seems
unrelated to fear of and exposure to pre-election violence.
To further disentangle the informational effect from ethnicity and partisanship, the main
two targeting characteristics discussed in the election violence literature to date (e.g., Kuhn,
2013; Wallsworth, 2016), we re-run the models with the full set of controls for both out-
comes among co-ethnics15 and incumbent partisan sub-samples. The results are presented
15Information on the incumbent’s ethnicity could not be found for Cape Verde, Gabon and Sao Tome &
Principe and the ethnicity question was not asked in Burundi, Egypt, Sudan, and Tunisia, which is why all
14
in Table I.
Table I here
The effect of newspaper readership on fear or and exposure to campaign violence among
co-ethnics and incumbent partisans is largely identical to those in Figure 1. This strengthens
our argument as the newspaper effect seems to be distinct from ethnicity and incumbent
partisanship. Hence, we find consistent evidence in support of our claim that more informed
voters in Africa are more likely to fear and be exposed to campaign violence. In the following
subsection we investigate the mechanism of our argument further.
To what extent are African newspaper readers like informed voters? To assess this claim
we regress newspaper readership on various attitudinal measures. The results are in Table II.
Table II here
Newspaper readers seem to share certain features with informed voters in the voter
information literature: they are significantly more likely to be interested in public affairs,
discuss politics with friends and family, more likely to agree with the statement that the
president must obey the law and courts, and are more likely to agree with the statement
that democracy is preferable to all other forms of government. They are also somewhat less
likely to identify in ethic than national terms, but this estimate is imprecisely estimated.
With regard to the size of the effects the results are mixed. The coefficient estimates on the
interest in public affairs and discussion of politics are meaningful: both effects are greater
than 19% of their outcomes’ standard deviation. The difference in support of the rule of
law and democracy, however, are rather small substantively: it is only 3% and 4% of the
outcome’s standard deviation, respectively.
The comparison of coefficient estimates across the different news sources further shows
that newspaper readers are not only more similar to informed voters than non-readers, but
observations from those countries had to be excluded from this analysis.
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by and large also more similar to informed voters than respondents receiving their news from
the radio, TV or internet. Of the 15 differences in coefficient estimates reported in the lower
part of Table II, 11 have a positive sign, of which 8 are statistically significant, indicating
that newspaper readers are significant more like informed voters than individuals receiving
news via other sources. Only 4 differences have a negative sign, all of which are small and
statistically insignificant. Taken together, our main results show that newspaper readers are
on average more similar to informed voters than non-readers and consumers of other news
sources and that there they are on average more fearful and more likely to be exposed to
campaign violence.
Robustness
We consider the robustness of our results with regard to (1) measurement and model spec-
ification, (2) social desirability bias, (3) reporting bias in election-related event data, and
(4) endogeneity. We start by assessing to what extent measurement and modelling choices
might be driving our main result. Appendix Table A.IV, Panel A, Columns 1 and 2 uses
the ordinal scaled indices underlying the newspaper readership measure. The main result
remains robust to the use of the index. Note that there seems to be a difference between
those respondents that never or rarely read newspapers and those that read newspapers
more regularly, but that there does not seem to be a dosage effect, which further justifies our
dichotomization. The lack of a dosage effect might be due to measurement issues mentioned
previously; it is consistent with findings in the voter information literature, which has largely
focused on exposure rather than dosage. When dosage effects are considered, no pure or only
conditional dosage effects are found (e.g. Dunning et al., 2019: chapter 4).
Because our country samples differ in size, we check to what extent our results might
be driven by the more populous countries with high-quality digitized maps (i.e., Uganda
and South Africa) by re-running our main models including probability weights to ensure
that each observation from each country has equal contribution (see Appendix Table A.IV,
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Panel A, Columns 3 and 4). Both the size and the direction of the estimates remains virtually
unchanged.
Finally, Appendix Table A.IV, Panel B of shows that the positive relationship between
newspaper readership and the logged number of election-related violent events is not limited
to our 25km buffer choice (Columns 1 and 2), that it is present when using only events from
the last two national elections rather than the last three national elections (Column 3), and
that it is not dependent on the inclusion of countries for which geographically imprecisely
coded events were dropped (Column 4).
Next we consider to what extent social desirability might account for the observed re-
lationship. If non-readers are significantly more likely to believe that a political party or
government agency sent the interviewer to the village and if incumbents are perceived to
be the primary perpetrators (see e.g. Straus & Taylor, 2012), then non-readers might be
more inclined to under-report fear of campaign violence. To address this issue, the main fear
model was re-run on two sub-samples: (1) those respondents that believed a political party
or government agency sent the interviewer or indicated that they did not know who sent
the interviewer (AFB6, q101) and (2) those that named the correct or another non-political
source. The coefficient estimates reported in Appendix Table A.V, Columns 1-2 are simi-
lar both across sub-samples (i.e., 3.7 and 3.5 percentage points increase, respectively) and
compared to the main result, mitigating social desirability concerns.
We also consider reporting bias. Event data based on newspaper reporting might be
biased towards urban areas, as events in such areas are more likely to be reported (Weid-
mann, 2016; Borzyskowski & Wahman, forthcoming). Moreover, when reporting on events
journalists might proxy location to the nearest urban location. If newspaper readers and
reported events are both clustered in urban areas, then this might result in overestimating
the effect even after including geographic controls. In order to address this concern, we re-
estimate our event model on both the urban and rural sub-samples separately. As shown in
Appendix Table A.V Columns 3 and 4, in both the urban and rural sample there is a positive
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and statistically significant association between newspaper readership and exposure to an
election-related violence event within 25km. In the urban sub-sample newspaper readers are
on average 3.1% and in the rural sub-sample 2.4% more likely to be exposed to campaign
violence, mitigating reporting bias concerns.
A final concern might be that our results are endogenous. There are at least three reasons
for this: (1) because exposure to political violence might have caused some voters to seek
out more independent and local political information, (2) newspaper readers might be more
fearful of election violence because they are more exposed to news about crime and violence,
not because they are more informed, and (3) because of the timing of the AFB6, we have
to rely on events from past rather than future elections. First, several empirical studies
have shown that past experience of violence motivates individuals to seek more information
(Badiuzzaman & Murshed, 2014; Soderstrom, 2018) and to boost their political engagement,
especially in terms of participation and community leadership (Blattman, 2009; Bellows
& Miguel, 2009). To assess this issue, we instrument newspaper readership via location-
specific Protestant mission density in the early 20th century. These missions spurred mass
literacy and provided access to the printing press in the surrounding areas (Woodberry,
2012), with long-term effects on newspaper availability and readership that persist until
today (Cage & Rueda, 2016). As detailed in Appendix B, we show that conditional on a large
set of historical geographic controls, Protestant mission density is strongly associated with
newspaper readership today (first stage F-statistic = 31 and 24 respectively, which is above
the weak instrument threshold of 10). The IV-estimates reported in Appendix Table A.IV
point in the same direction, are larger, but less precisely estimated than the OLS estimates.
To address the second reason, we have included additional measures of fear to account for the
media effect (i.e., have you felt unsafe walking in your neighborhood (AFB6, q10a) and have
you feared crime in your home (AFB6, q10b)). Including those additional fear indicators as
controls (Appendix Table A.VI, Panel B) reduces the fear estimates slightly, but they remain
positive and significant. To address the last reason, we have re-run our models in Figure 1
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using AFB416 and campaign violence event data from the two following national elections
coded as described above. The coefficient estimates (see Appendix Table A.VI, Panel A)
are slightly smaller (i.e., 3 percentage point change for fear and 2% for exposure to violence)
but consistently positive and statistically significant. While we are unable to fully resolve
endogeneity concerns given the observational data, the combination of our three robustness
checks mitigates these concerns.
Conclusion
In developing democracies politicians are less constrained in their choice of campaign strate-
gies, including fraud, vote buying, and violence. We argue that informed voters are more
likely to be exposed to campaign violence than uninformed voters, because they are harder
to sway through the use of non-violent campaign strategies, such as policy promises, ethnic
appeals, and vote buying.
After providing illustrative evidence from recent electoral campaigns in Zimbabwe and
Uganda, we use geocoded survey data from 35 African countries and geocoded data of
violent events during election campaign periods to assess our argument more systematically.
We show that newspaper readers are significantly more likely to fear and be exposed to
campaign violence. This finding is robust to changes in measurement of the main variables,
statistical modelling specifications, and testing for social desirability, reporting bias, and
endogeneity. We also present evidence in support of our theoretical mechanism, showing
that newspaper readers have similar attitudes and beliefs to informed voters in the voter
information literature.
By shedding light on who is more likely to fear and be exposed to campaign violence,
this paper contributes to the development of the phenomenon’s micro-foundations. Aside
from partisanship and poverty the existing literature has not highlighted any other voter
16The AFB4 data was collected in 2008 and early 2009 in 20 sub-Saharan African countries. It is the first
AFB survey to ask whether respondent fear becoming a victim of campaign violence.
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attributes that are systematically associated with electoral victimization during campaigns.
This research suggests that the exposure to information increases exposure to campaign
violence. For work exploring the consequences of electoral violence on political behavior and
beliefs, this implies that we should expect heterogenous effects of campaign violence. For
example, changes in vote choice and mistrust in elections and other democratic institutions
among victims of electoral violence should be mitigated by the extent to which they are
exposed to independent information.
As a research field, we still have a weak understanding of whom politicians target with
election violence at the micro- and meso-level. Voter information is one pathway among
others, such as partisanship or ethnicity. While we think there is evidence for a general
tendency of information to play a role, there is likely heterogeneity depending on country and
local contexts, which we encourage future research to explore. For example, the information-
violence link should be weaker when more people are well informed (which is more likely in
more developed countries), when politicians rarely use violence (which is more likely in more
democratic countries), and when violence is relative more expensive and thus less attractive
than other forms of manipulation such as vote buying (which depends on the rule of law and
the independence of the police).
Our findings provide a cautionary note that improving voter information can have unin-
tended negative consequences. It may not be the silver bullet to more accountable politicians
and better policies, particularly in less democratic countries where politicians choose freely
from a wider menu of (legal and illicit) campaign strategies. Much more research is needed to
understand the causal mechanisms of voter information, how it affects strategic interactions,
and under which conditions certain effects obtain.
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Figure 1. Main result
Newspaper reader
Radio
TV
Internet
Urban
Capital
Distance to capital
Age
Age^2
Male
Living condition: Fairly bad
Neither good nor bad
Fairly good
Very good
Employment: No, looking
Yes, part time
Yes, full time
Education: Informal/Incomplete
Complete primary
Complete secondary
Post-Secondary education
University education
Post-graduate education
Poverty index
Non-partisan
Incumbent partisan
-.1 -.05 0 .05 -.2 0 .2 .4
Fear Events
The baseline model (circles) include country fixed effects, alternative news sources (radio, TV and internet),
geographic (urban and capital indicators, distance to capital), and demographic (age, age2, and male) con-
trols. Estimates denoted by squares also include socio-economic (living condition-, employment-, education-
fixed effects, and a poverty index) controls and those denoted by triangles also include political controls
(incumbent partisan and non-partisan indicators). 95% confidence intervals are derived from clustered stan-
dard errors at the location level.
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Table I. Information effect within co-ethnics and incumbent partisans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Co-ethnics Incumbent
Fear Event Fear Event
(mean=0.43;
sd=0.49)
(mean=0.25;
sd=0.62)
(mean=0.45;
sd=0.50)
(mean=0.18;
sd=0.55)
Newspaper reader 0.055** 0.052* 0.042** 0.034*
(0.015) (0.022) (0.014) (0.016)
R-Squared 0.163 0.363 0.126 0.340
Observations 8,688 8,688 9,529 9,529
Clusters 1,828 1,828 2,767 2,767
All regressions include country fixed effects, alternative news sources (radio, TV and internet), geo-
graphic (urban and capital indicators), demographic (age, age2, and male), and socio-economic (living
condition-, employment-, education-fixed effects, and a poverty index). Columns 1 and 2 also include
political controls (incumbent partisan and non-partisan indicators). Estimates significant at the 0.05
(0.01) level are marked with * (**). Standard errors are clustered at the location level.
Table II. Newspaper readers’ similarity to informed voters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Interest Discuss Ethnicity Rule of law Democracy
(mean=1.58;
sd=1.08)
(mean=0.88;
sd=0.70)
(mean=2.21;
sd=1.17)
(mean=2.27;
sd=1.37)
(mean=1.64;
sd=0.67)
β1: Newspaper reader 0.209** 0.147** -0.024 0.044* 0.025*
(0.017) (0.011) (0.020) (0.022) (0.012)
β2: Radio 0.176** 0.162** -0.027 -0.062** 0.039**
(0.016) (0.010) (0.020) (0.021) (0.011)
β3: TV 0.059** 0.063** -0.063** -0.067** 0.027*
(0.017) (0.011) (0.021) (0.023) (0.012)
β4: Internet 0.091** 0.082** 0.008 -0.007 0.006
(0.018) (0.011) (0.022) (0.024) (0.013)
β1 − β2 0.033 -0.015 0.003 0.105** -0.014
(0.023) (0.015) (0.029) (0.032) (0.017)
β1 − β3 0.15** 0.084** 0.039 0.111** -0.001
(0.025) (0.017) (0.031) (0.035) (0.018)
β1 − β4 0.118** 0.065** -0.032 0.050 0.019
(0.027) (0.018) (0.159) (0.036) (0.019)
R-Squared 0.130 0.151 0.083 0.051 0.069
Observations 32,286 32,168 28,835 31,475 29,300
Clusters 3,993 3,992 3,699 3,991 3,985
All regressions include country fixed effects, geographic (urban and capital indicators), demographic (age, age2, and male),
socio-economic (living condition-, employment-, education-fixed effects, and a poverty index), and political controls (incumbent
partisan and non-partisan indicators). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.01) level are marked with * (**). Standard errors
are clustered at the location level.
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Supplementary Online Materials to
“Dangerously Informed”
Inken von Bozyskowski and Patrick M Kuhn
The Supplementary Material for this paper consists of three sections. Section A presents
the summary statistics of and bivariate correlations between all variables and most of the
robustness tables mentioned in the main text. Section B describes the instrumental variable
regression addressing the endogeneity concern and presents the first stage, OLS and 2SLS
regression results. Finally, Section C presents the full regression output underlying Figure 1.
Below a brief overview of all Appendix Tables.
• Appendix Table A.I: Summary statistics of AFB6 variables used in the empirical
analysis
• Appendix Table A.II: Bivariate correlations of AFB6 variables used in the empirical
analysis
• Appendix Table A.III: Balance checks on precisely and imprecisely geocoded survey
respondents in AFB6
• Appendix Table A.IV: Re-estimation of the main result using alternative measures
and model specifications
• Appendix Table A.V: Split sample regressions to assess social desirability bias and
reporting bias
• Appendix Table A.VI: Re-estimation of the main result using AFB4 data and fu-
ture election-related campaign violence events and controlling for alternative fears of
violence account for potential media effects
• Appendix Table B.I: Summary statistics of additional variables used in the IV-
regression
• Appendix Table B.II: Impact of information on fear of pre-electoral violence and
election-related violent events
• Appendix Table C.I: Regression estimates underlying Figure 1
33
A Summary Statistics, Partial Correlations, and Ro-
bustness Tables
Table A.I. Summary statistics AFB6 data
Variable Median Mean Std.Dev. Min Max N
Panel A: Main outcome variables
Fear of campaign violence 0 0.461 0.498 0 1 32,506
Election-related conflict events 0 0.223 0.573 0 3.555 32,506
Interest in politics 2 1.578 1.079 0 3 32,320
Discuss politics 1 0.881 0.702 0 2 32,200
Ethnicity 2 2.208 1.173 1 5 28,860
Rule of law 2 2.287 1.370 1 5 31.506
Democracy 2 1.644 0.674 1 2 29,331
Panel B: Main explanatory variable
Newspaper reader 0 0.323 0.468 0 1 32,472
Panel C: Controls
Radio 1 0.793 0.405 0 1 32,506
TV 1 0.581 0.493 0 1 32,506
Internet 0 0.256 0.437 0 1 32,506
Urban 0 0.438 0.496 0 1 32,506
Capital 0 0.055 0.229 0 1 32,506
Distance to capital 5.301 4.784 1.621 0 7.503 32,506
Age 34 37,208 14,340 18 105 32,993
Male 1 0.501 0.500 0 1 32,506
Living condition 3 2.774 1.195 1 5 32,506
Employment 1 1.294 1.230 0 3 32,506
Education 3 2.533 1.765 0 6 32,506
Poverty 1 1.122 0.988 0 4 32,506
Incumbent partisan 0 0.293 0.455 0 1 32,506
Non-partisan 0 0.401 0.490 0 1 32,506
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Table A.II. Correlation matrix
Newspaper Fear Election Interest in Discuss Ethnicity Rule Democracy Radio TV Internet
reader campaign conflict politics politics of law
violence events
Newspaper reader 1.000
Fear of campaign violence 0.049 1.000
Election conflict events 0.174 0.083 1.000
Interest in politics 0.099 -0.033 -0.030 1.000
Discuss politics 0.156 0.001 0.040 0.541 1.000
Ethnicity -0.016 0.039 -0.054 -0.013 -0.028 1.000
Rule of law -0.048 0.003 -0.054 -0.008 -0.015 -0.012 1.000
Democracy 0.019 -0.046 0.012 0.050 0.041 -0.009 -0.083 1.000
Radio 0.160 0.017 0.013 0.119 0.148 -0.009 -0.038 0.050 1.000
TV 0.445 0.034 0.204 0.017 0.117 -0.028 -0.051 -0.000 0.190 1.000
Internet 0.499 0.041 0.168 0.063 0.125 -0.015 -0.041 0.003 0.100 0.409 1.000
Urban 0.318 0.056 0.366 -0.036 0.045 -0.029 -0.053 -0.013 0.041 0.435 0.323
Capital 0.183 0.021 0.235 -0.003 0.032 0.011 -0.033 -0.007 -0.017 0.146 0.145
Distance to capital -0.199 0.022 -0.430 0.009 -0.052 0.003 0.061 -0.028 -0.018 -0.219 -0.203
Age -0.103 -0.093 -0.065 0.064 0.027 -0.021 -0.007 0.023 0.016 -0.133 -0.266
Male 0.091 -0.037 -0.005 0.164 0.178 -0.027 -0.031 0.034 0.114 0.022 0.077
Living condition 0.162 -0.055 0.008 0.054 0.027 -0.026 0.022 0.009 0.056 0.147 0.191
Employment 0.214 0.028 0.048 0.082 0.100 -0.016 -0.028 0.009 0.116 0.179 0.171
Education 0.494 0.083 0.185 0.085 0.149 -0.019 -0.063 0.007 0.139 0.428 0.528
Poverty index -0.234 0.082 0.017 -0.039 -0.016 -0.010 0.015 -0.016 -0.120 -0.270 -0.233
Non-partisan 0.034 -0.004 0.073 -0.214 -0.200 0.033 -0.019 -0.024 -0.072 0.087 0.084
Incumbent partisan 0.017 -0.019 -0.044 0.123 0.084 -0.056 0.044 0.024 0.033 -0.043 -0.045
Opposition partisan -0.052 0.019 -0.033 0.104 0.127 0.020 -0.022 0.002 0.042 -0.049 -0.044
continued on next page
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Table A.II: Correlation matrix – continued
Urban Capital Distance to Age Male Living Employment Education Poverty Non-partisan Incumbent Opposition
capital condition partisan partisan
Urban 1.000
Capital 0.276 1.000
Distance to capital -0.347 -0.516 1.000
Age -0.120 -0.052 0.048 1.000
Male -0.016 -0.003 0.004 0.117 1.000
Living condition 0.051 0.032 0.011 -0.078 -0.001 1.000
Employment 0.136 0.059 -0.074 -0.041 0.105 0.027 1.000
Education 0.361 0.164 -0.192 -0.258 0.087 0.156 0.296 1.000
Poverty index -0.146 -0.032 0.056 0.049 -0.008 -0.309 -0.166 -0.257 1.000
Non-partisan 0.103 0.047 -0.155 -0.090 -0.078 0.001 -0.055 0.035 0.008 1.000
Incumbent partisan -0.066 -0.018 0.125 0.056 0.016 0.067 0.053 0.001 -0.047 -0.510 1.000
Opposition partisan -0.044 0.040 0.039 0.066 -0.066 0.006 -0.037 0.038 -0.548 -0.440 1.000
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Table A.III. Balance in geographic precision coding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Newspa-
per
reader
Fear
Cam-
paign
violence
Election-
related
violent
event
Interest Discuss Ethnicity
Rule of
law
Democ-
racy
Panel A: Country fixed effects only
Precise geocoded 0.012 -0.003 0.099** -0.044* -0.016 -0.021 -0.011 0.004
(0.012) (0.008) (0.026) (0.017) (0.012) (0.024) (0.024) (0.012)
R-Squared 0.173 0.128 0.115 0.039 0.029 0.069 0.041 0.059
Observations 45,233 45,233 45,233 44,970 44,794 38,706 43,897 40,727
Clusters 4,845 4,845 4,845 4,844 4,842 4,381 4,842 4,834
Panel B: Full set of controls and country fixed effects
Precise geocoded -0.005 -0.006 0.058** -0.041* -0.018 -0.023 0.001 0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.022) (0.017) (0.010) (0.024) (0.023) (0.012)
R-Squared 0.417 0.143 0.306 0.129 0.147 0.080 0.051 0.067
Observations 45,233 45,233 45,233 44,970 44,794 38,706 43,897 40,727
Clusters 4,845 4,845 4,845 4,844 4,842 4,381 4,842 4,834
All regressions include country fixed effects. Panel B also includes alternative information (radio, TV and internet), geographic (urban
and capital indicators and distance to capital), demographic (age, age2, and male), socio-economic (living condition-, employment-
, education-fixed effects, and a poverty index), and political controls (incumbent partisan and non-partisan indicators). Estimates
significant at the 0.05 (0.01) level are marked with * (**). Standard errors are clustered at the location level.
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Table A.IV. Re-estimation of main result using alternative measures and specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Alternative measures and specifications
Fear Event Fear Event
(mean=0.46;
sd=0.50)
(mean=0.22
;sd=0.57)
(mean=0.46
;sd=0.50)
(mean=0.22
;sd=0.57)
Less than once a month 0.039** 0.015
(0.011) (0.014)
Few times a month 0.039** 0.027*
(0.010) (0.013)
Few times a week 0.057** 0.039*
(0.010) (0.018)
Daily 0.043** 0.064**
(0.012) (0.021)
Newspaper reader 0.040** 0.024
(0.008) (0.013)
Weights No No Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.150 0.376 0.149 0.389
Observations 32,472 32,472 32,472 32,472
Clusters 3,994 3,994 3,994 3,994
Panel B: Alternative measures of election-related violent events
Election-related conflict events
10km 40km
Last 2
elections
Precise
codings
(mean=0.13;
sd=0.45)
(mean=0.28;
sd=0.62)
(mean=0.20;
sd=0.53)
(mean=0.20;
sd=0.48)
Newspaper reader 0.019 0.038** 0.025* 0.029**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010)
R-Squared 0.267 0.389 0.366 0.447
Observations 32,472 32,472 32,472 20,097
Clusters 3,994 3,994 3,994 2,520
All regressions include country fixed effects, alternative information sources (radio, TV and internet),
geographic (urban and capital indicators and distance to capital), demographic controls (age, age2, and
male), socio-economic (living condition-, employment-, education-fixed effects, and a poverty index),
and political controls (incumbent partisan and non-partisan indicators). Regressions in Columns 3 and
4 in Panel A are probability weighted to give countries equal weight. Estimates significant at the 0.05
(0.01) level are marked with * (**). Standard errors are clustered at the location level.
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Table A.V. Social desirability and reporting bias
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social desirability bias Reporting bias
Pol. source or
DK
Non-pol. source Urban Rural
(mean=0.46;
sd=0.50)
(mean=0.48;
sd=0.50)
(mean=0.45;
sd=0.76)
(mean=0.05;
sd=0.26)
Newspaper reader 0.037** 0.035** 0.031 0.024**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.018) (0.008)
R-Squared 0.135 0.174 0.458 0.116
Observations 15,947 16,485 14,203 18,269
Clusters 3,726 3,722 1,732 2,359
All regressions include country fixed effects, alternative information sources (radio, TV and internet),
geographic (urban and capital indicators and distance to capital), demographic (age, age2, and male),
socio-economic (living condition-, employment-, education-fixed effects, and a poverty index), and po-
litical controls (incumbent partisan and non-partisan indicators).Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.01)
level are marked with * (**). Standard errors are clustered at the location level.
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Table A.VI. AFB4 with future election-related conflict events and controlling for non-election
related fears
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fear of campaign violence Election-related conflict events
Panel A: AFB 4 data with future election-related conflict events
(mean=0.46 ; sd=0.50) (mean=0.22 ; sd=0.57)
Newspaper reader 0.020* 0.030** 0.029** 0.027** 0.021** 0.020**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Socio-economic controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Political controls No No Yes No No Yes
R-Squared 0.116 0.123 0.125 0.297 0.300 0.301
Observations 16,303 16,303 16,303 16,303 16,303 16,303
Clusters 2,261 2,261 2,261 2,261 2,261 2,261
Panel B: Controlling for non-election-related fears
(mean=0.46; sd=0.50) (mean=0.22 ; sd=0.57)
Newspaper Reader 0.030** 0.036** 0.035** 0.042** 0.035** 0.036**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Feel unsafe 0.024** 0.020** 0.020** 0.011* 0.010* 0.010*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Fear crime 0.026** 0.024** 0.024** 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Socio-economic controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Political controls No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.148 0.153 0.157 0.374 0.376 0.376
Observations 32,392 32,392 32,392 32,392 32,392 32,392
Clusters 3,994 3,994 3,994 3,994 3,994 3,994
All regressions include country fixed effects, alternative information sources (radio, TV and internet
(Panel B only)), geographic (urban and capital indicators, distance to capital), and demographic controls
(age, age2, and male). Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 also include socioeconomic and political controls as
indicated. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.01) level are marked with * (**). Standard errors are
clustered at the location level.
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B Instrumental variable regression using historical
Protestant mission location
To address endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable approach. In particular,
we instrument voter information via location-level Protestant mission density in the early
20th century. These missions spurred mass literacy and provided access to the printing
press in the surrounding areas (Woodberry, 2012), with long-term effects that persist until
today. Colonial Protestant missions have been praised for their long-term positive effects
on literacy, education, and information. Notably, Woodberry (2004; 2012) proposed the
‘mission education hypothesis’ and provided cross-national evidence of this effect, which was
substantiated in sub-national analyses (Lankina & Getachew, 2012; Wietzke, 2012). Further,
mission activities have contributed to democratic development by supporting mass printing,
newspapers, reforms, the public sphere, and civil society (Cage & Rueda, 2016; Woodberry,
2012). Thus, we leverage data on colonial Protestant missions in sub-Saharan Africa.
In this Appendix, we describe the data source, discuss how the instrument satisfied the
IV assumptions, describe the estimation and present the IV results.
B.1 Data on Protestant missions and controls
Information on the location of Protestant missions in Africa in 1924 comes from a map
published by William RM Roome and digitalized by Nunn (2010).17 It provides the exact
location of all Protestant missions in Africa in 1924. A mission is defined as a location estab-
lished by foreign missionaries with the intention to convert, educate, or assist in other ways
the indigenous populations. Hence, churches developed by indigenous people for themselves
or churches serving the immigrant (i.e., white) people are not recorded (Nunn, 2016: 4). The
map was regarded as reputable by early 20th century experts in the field, who confirmed
the accuracy of mission locations (e.g., E.W.S., 1925). In order to spatially join the survey
data with the location of Protestant missions in 1924 and geocoded conflict data, we used
the location information in AfroBarometer 6.
Our instrument is the number of (#) Protestant missions in 1924 within 25 kilometers
of a location.18 As the impact of each additional Protestant mission is likely to have a
marginally diminishing impact on newspaper readership, we take the logarithm of the number
of Protestant missions plus one.
We include a series of historical geographic controls to ensure conditional independence
between a location’s Protestant mission density in 1924 and current-day Newspaper Readers.
In particular, we include factors that have been shown to influence settlement decisions of
Protestant missions (Johnson, 1967; Nunn, 2016). To capture the accessibility of a location
with regard to supplies from Europe, prior knowledge about the area, settlement patterns,
and economic development, we construct, based on the map of The Century Company (1897)
that was digitized by Nunn (2016), a series of dichotomous indicator variables if a Railway
or Explorer route is located within 25km of a location. Using the Global Mapping Inter-
17The map was originally entitled ‘Ethnographic Survey of Africa: Showing the Tribes and Languages;
also the Stations of Missionary Societies.’
18Our main results are qualitatively similar if we choose slightly smaller (10km) or larger (40km) distances.
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national’s (GMI) Seamless Digital Chart of the World Version 3.2 and the FAO’s Global
Agro-Ecological Assessment for Agriculture database, we also control for the log distance
from the Equator, log distance from the Coast, closeness to a major River and Lake, Eleva-
tion, and Agricultural suitability. Moreover, Protestant missions were more often established
where slavery was prevalent due to their frequent (but not universal) interest in ending the
slave trade (Johnson, 1967; Nunn, 2010: 148). Thus we also control for the intensity of the
Atlantic and Indian Slave trade. This measure is constructed following Nunn & Wantchekon
(2011) by dividing the total number of slaves taken from each ethnic group on Murdock’s
(1959) list by the size of the ethnic group, which is proxied by the amount of land they in-
habited during the early 20th century. All locations within the pre-colonial settlement area
of an ethnic group are assigned the slave trade intensity measure of that group. Finally, we
include indicators for Urban (AFB6, URBRUR) and for the Capital of the country to proxy
for historical population density.
Appendix Table B.I provides the summary statistics on the IV-specific historical geo-
graphic controls.
Table B.I. IV-specific summary statistics
Variable Median Mean Std.Dev. Min Max N
Panel A: Instruments
# Protestant missions (25km, log) 0 0.278 0.443 0 2.079 32,506
Panel B: Historical geographic controls
Explorer (25km) 0 0.128 0.335 0 1 32,506
Railway (25km) 0 0.179 0.383 0 1 32,506
River (25km) 0 0.233 0.422 0 1 32,506
Lake (25km) 0 0.056 0.229 0 1 32,506
Elevation 334 320.674 1784.729 0 2912 32,506
Agricultural suitability 2.571 2.452 1.342 0 5 32,506
Distance to the equator (log) 7.132 6.785 1.297 -4.035 8.325 32,506
Distance to the coast (log) 5.460 4.540 2.393 -5.438 7.443 32,506
Slave trade per squared km 0.004 2.093 7.368 0 42.562 32,061
B.2 IV Assumptions
An instrumental variable (IV) strategy which relies on the following two assumptions: in-
strumental relevance and the exclusion restriction (Angrist & Pischke, 2009: chapter 4).
Specifically, we exploit differences in the local density of Protestant missions in 1924 to
estimate the impact of information on being targeted by pre-election violence in the 21st
century, circumventing endogeneity. In this section we make the case that our instrument is
(1) valid because it is a key determinant of modern-day newspaper readership in sub-Saharan
Africa and (2) satisfies the exclusion restriction conditional on geographic and demographic
controls. Thereafter we introduce our statistical model and discuss our results.
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B.2.1 Relevance of the instrument
We establish instrumental relevance along the following lines: (1) Protestant missions spurred
mass literacy by providing literacy and the printing press to the local community; (2) these
differences in informational endowments between locations have persisted over time into
the modern period; and (3) our first-stage regressions show that Protestant mission density
is a strong predictor of newspaper readership in 2014/15, conditional on geographic and
demographic controls.
First, Protestant missions have influenced literacy and informational endowments of local
communities through several mission policies: literacy training, schooling, and the introduc-
tion of the printing press. A key element of their conversion strategy was to enable locals to
read the bible (Nunn, 2016: 147; Lankina & Getachew, 2012: 12; Pinto, 2011: 3). Providing
mass literacy was therefore a necessary element of the Protestant conversion strategy, al-
though some Catholic missions also engaged in it to some degree, especially when forced to
compete for converts with Protestants (Woodberry, 2004: 12; Woodberry, 2012: 251, 256).
To print bibles, educational material, pamphlets, and mission newspapers in the local lan-
guage (Pinto, 2011; Sanneh, 2008), Protestants brought the printing press to Africa, which
soon created demand for other publications (Lankina & Getachew, 2012: 476), giving rise
to indigenous newspapers at these mission locations with a lasting effect on contemporary
newspaper supplies and readership (Cage & Rueda, 2016). By enabling citizens to read and
introducing the printing press, Protestant missions had a catalytic effect on local communi-
ties’ access to independent information about politics. Literate communities are better able
to attain written information than their illiterate counterparts, and information has been
shown to have differential effects on knowledge, attitudes, and behavior (Pande, 2011).
Second, differences in informational endowments around colonial Protestant missions in
Africa have persisted for more than 200 years (Woodberry, 2004, 2012; Gallego & Woodberry,
2010; Nunn, 2009, 2016; Wantchekon, Klasnja & Novta, 2015). Both cross- and sub-national
research (Woodberry, 2004, 2012; Lankina & Getachew, 2012; Wietzke, 2012) has found
that groups and areas exposed to Protestant missions have substantially different levels of
modern-day literacy, schooling, and human capital than those groups and areas with no
exposure to Protestant missions, which is due to intra-household generational transmission
and path-dependent local institutional investments (Wietzke, 2012; Huillery, 2009; Lankina
& Getachew, 2012: 467).
Third, for the instrument to be relevant more technically, it must be strong. That is, the
1924 Protestant mission density within 25km of a location must be highly correlated with
the frequency by which respondents in 2015 get their news from a paper. If the association
is weak, the resulting IV estimates are uninformative (Stock & Yogo, 2005; Murray, 2006).
We show in Appendix Table A.IV Columns 1 and 4 that Protestant mission density within
25km of a location is a strong predictor of newspaper readership, conditional on country-
fixed effects, geographic and demographic controls. The F-statistic is above 27, which is
well above 10, the weak instrument rule of thumb (Stock & Yogo, 2005), and signifies sta-
tistical relevance. Doubling Protestant mission density within walking distance increases
the likelihood of a respondent reading the newspaper at least some of the time by around
6 percentage points, which is between a 12.8% percent increase in the outcome’s standard
deviation. Hence, in line with previous research (Woodberry, 2004; Cage & Rueda, 2016;
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Wietzke, 2012; Woodberry, 2012) our first stage results suggest that local Protestant mission
density in 1924 has had a robust and lasting impact on newspaper readership today.
B.2.2 Exclusion restriction
The validity of our IV strategy also rests on the exclusion restriction being satisfied. In our
case, the number of Protestant missions must be conditionally independent of other deter-
minants of victimization and turnout. In other words, Protestant missions should influence
pre-election violence exclusively through voter information, conditional on geographic con-
trols. Since this exclusion restriction is ultimately untestable, we discuss – and rule out
– alternative channels based on the pre-electoral violence literature. In particular, the re-
striction would be violated if mission density was correlated with other, unobserved deter-
minants of campaign violence. Drivers of campaign violence include (i) a likely incumbent
loss (Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013; Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014; Wilkinson & Haid,
2009); (ii) a greater incumbency advantage (Chaturvedi, 2005; Krieger, 2000) (iii) religious
tensions (Lewis, 2003; International Crisis Group, 2007b,a, 2011); (iv) fraud in the cam-
paigning period (Norris, 2012; Arriola & Johnson, 2012); and (v) the presence of observers
on election-day (Daxecker, 2014).
While many of these factors are most likely uncorrelated with Protestant mission density,
one potential issue is the presence of election observers. If historical infrastructure (roads,
rivers, railways) is similarly distributed as their modern equivalent (Jedwab & Moradi, 2016),
observers might be more likely to observe polling places in easy-to-reach areas. In that case,
infrastructure would correlate positively with both historical mission location and modern
observer presence. However, since research on observers and campaign violence has only
relied on national-level data, it is unclear whether the relationship also exists sub-nationally,
within countries. To further alleviate this concern, we include geographic controls for his-
torical infrastructure.
More importantly, we stress that other mission benefits, such as today’s level of democ-
racy and development work through the literacy education channel central to our instru-
mental relevance argument and not independently. As Woodberry notes, the relationship
of church and state influenced formal education, which ‘in turn influenced post-colonial de-
mocratization’ (Woodberry, 2004: 11-13; Nunn, 2009: 28). We thus conclude that our
instrument is relevant and satisfies the exclusion restriction.
B.3 Statistical model
To assess the impact of free information on campaign violence, we estimate the following
simultaneous linear equation system:
Outcome = α0 + α1Newspaper reader + γXi + δk + ,
Newspaper reader = β0 + β1log(# Protestant missions) + γXi + δk + ν,
where α1 is the parameter of interest, the treatment variable Newspaper readers is en-
dogenous, the instrument # of Protestant missions is exogenous conditional on the vector of
geographic and demographic controls γXi and country fixed effects δk. Subscript k indicates
country and i indicates individual. Standard errors are clustered at the location level to
account for the lack of within location variation of our instrument. The IV-estimation is
performed using the two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) estimator.
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B.4 First stage and IV results
This section presents our 2SLS results and discusses its robustness with regard to alternative
explanations. Table B.II presents the empirical evidence that newspaper readers are more
likely to fear campaign violence (Panel A) and experience election-related conflict events
(Panel B).
Table B.II. Impact of information on fear of pre-electoral violence and election-related violent
events
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Stage OLS 2SLS 1. Stage OLS 2SLS
Panel A: Fear of campaign violence (mean=0.46; sd=0.50)
Protestant mission density 0.055** 0.055**
(0.010) (0.010)
Newspaper reader 0.030** 0.207 0.032** 0.194
(0.007) (0.281) (0.007) (0.272)
1. Stage F-statistic 31.17 31.08
Demographic controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.249 0.125 0.109 0.269 0.129 0.116
Observations 30,034 30,034 30,034 30,034 30,034 30,034
Clusters 3,754 3,754 3,754 3,754 3,754 3,754
Panel B: Election-related conflict events (mean=0.22; sd=0.57)
Protest mission density 0.055** 0.055**
(0.031) (0.010)
Newspaper reader 0.038** 4.998** 0.037** 4.872**
(0.010) (1.306) (0.011) (1.252)
1. Stage F-statistic 31.17 31.08
Demographic controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.249 0.479 0.269 0.479
Observations 30,034 30,034 30,034 30,034 30,034 30,034
Clusters 3,754 3,754 3,754 3,754 3,754 3,754
Instrument in the 2SLS estimations is the logged number of Protestant missions within 25km of a Location.
All regressions include country fixed effects, geographic and historical controls. In addition, Columns 4-6
include demographic controls (age, age2, and male). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.01) level are marked
with * (**). Standard errors are clustered at the location level.
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C Regression Table Underlying Figure 1
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Table C.I. Regression estimates underlying Figure 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fear of campaign violence Election-related conflict events
(mean=0.46; sd=0.50) (mean=0.22 ; sd=0.57)
Newspaper reader 0.032** 0.039** 0.038** 0.043** 0.036** 0.036**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Radio 0.024** 0.027** 0.027** -0.009 -0.012 -0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
TV 0.001 0.015 0.014 0.065** 0.063** 0.063**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Internet -0.009 0.006 0.005 0.016 0.008 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Urban 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.228** 0.225** 0.223**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Capital 0.025 0.024 0.021 -0.057 -0.056 -0.056
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
Distance to capital 0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.147** -0.147** -0.146**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age -0.002 -0.002* -0.002* -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.036** -0.039** -0.040** -0.005* -0.010** -0.009**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Living condition 0.001 0.003 0.024** 0.024**
Fairly bad (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Neither good nor bad -0.020* -0.013 0.007 0.006
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Fairly good -0.022* -0.015 0.006 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Very good -0.068** -0.061** 0.025 0.027
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Employment 0.014 0.015* 0.006 0.007
No, looking (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Yes, part time 0.007 0.007 0.029* 0.030*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Yes, full time -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Informal/-complete 0.027** 0.026** 0.021* 0.022*
schooling (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Complete primary 0.006 0.005 0.026* 0.027*
schooling (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Complete secondary 0.012 0.009 0.054** 0.055**
schooling (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Post-secondary 0.026* 0.021 0.062** 0.062**
education (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
University education 0.006 -0.000 0.056** 0.056**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018)
Post-graduate education -0.004 -0.012 0.085** 0.086**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024)
Poverty 0.039** 0.038** 0.015** 0.015**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Non-partisan -0.030** 0.022**
(0.007) (0.008)
Incumbent partisan -0.092** -0.003
(0.008) (0.011)
Constant 0.491** 0.436** 0.474** 0.817** 0.752** 0.734**
(0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063)
R-Squared 0.138 0.145 0.149 0.374 0.375 0.376
Observations 32,472 32,472 32,472 32,472 32,472 32,472
Clusters 3,994 3,994 3,994 3,994 3,994 3,994
All regressions include country fixed effects, alternative information sources (radio, TV and internet), geographic
(urban and capital indicators), and demographic controls (age, age2, and male). Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 also
include socioeconomic and political controls as indicated. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.01) level are marked
with * (**). Standard errors are clustered at the location level.
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